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PROBATE: APPLICATION OF OREGON ALIEN INHERITANCE
STATUTE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS INTRUSION
INTO FIELD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)
Decedent, a resident of Oregon, died intestate leaving an estate comprised
of both real and personal property. Her next of kin, aliens residing in East
Germany, sued for a determination of heirship in their favor. This action was
contested by the Oregon Land Board, which requested that the property be
escheated to the state pursuant to an Oregon statute.1 The statute required
escheat unless there existed a reciprocal right of United States citizens to
receive property situated in a foreign country on the same terms as a citizen
of the foreign country; unless United States citizens had the right to receive
money payments from foreign estates within the United States or its territories; and unless proof was offered that the foreign heir could inherit without
confiscation by the foreign government. The plaintiffs contended that two
German treaties 2 provided for reciprocal rights of inheritance but in any
event the Oregon statute was unconstitutional. The trial court, ignoring the
constitutional issue found as a matter of fact that the statutory reciprocity
requirements had not been met and ruled that the estate must escheat. The
Supreme Court of Oregon 3 affirmed and dismissed the argument that the
Oregon statute was unconstitutional on its face. On appeal the United States
Supreme Court HELD, that the Oregon statute was unconstitutional in its
application. The requirement by the court of proof of the actual existence
of reciprocity was held to be an intrusion by the state into the field of
foreign affairs, exclusively reserved by the Constitution to the federal government.
1. ORE. REv. STAT. §111.070 (1965), which provides: "(1) The right of an alien not
residing within the United States or its territories to take either real or personal property
or the proceeds thereof in this state by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the
same terms and conditions as inhabitants and citizens of the United States, is dependent
in each case: (a) Upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the
United States to take real and personal property and the proceeds thereof upon the same
terms and conditions as inhabitants and citizens of the country of which such alien is an
inhabitant or citizen; (b) Upon the rights of citizens of the United States to receive by
payment to them within the United States or its territories money originating from the
estates of persons dying within such foreign country; and (c) Upon proof that such foreign
heirs, distributees, devisees or legatees may receive the benefit, use or control of money
or property from estates of persons dying in this state without confiscation, in whole or in
part, by the governments of such foreign countries. (2) The burden is upon such nonresident alien to establish the fact of existence of the reciprocal rights set forth in subsection
(I) of this section. (3) If such reciprocal rights are not found to exist and if no heir, devisee or legatee other than such alien is found eligible to take such property, the property
shall be disposed of as escheated property."
2. Treaty with Germany of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, Dec. 8, 1923,
44 Stat. 2132, 2135 (1925); Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 (1956).
3. Zschernig v. Miller, 243 Ore. 567, 412 P.2d 781 (1966).
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With the outbreak of World War II, states began passing statutes placing
conditions upon inheritance by aliens living in unfriendly countries. Today,
these are commonly referred to as "Iron Curtain Statutes." Generally they
5
fall into two categories, benefit or use statutes4 and reciprocity statutes.
Benefit or use statutes are found mostly in the eastern states. These
statutes do not allow nonresident inheritance where it appears that the
alien heir might not have the full use and benefit of the property due to
government confiscation. Any property withheld is paid into the court or
other appropriate state agency. The alien heir can later petition the court
and if he can show that he would then benefit from a distribution, the court
will pay over the property. Massachusetts holds the property upon interest
and pays over such interest as well.6
Since World War 11, benefit or use statutes have predominantly affected
heirs living in Iron Curtain countries.7 The courts in their determination
of whether an heir will have the full benefit and use of his inheritance have
8
relied heavily upon Treasury, State, and Justice Department circulars. These
circulars have set guidelines for determining which countries have confiscatory
policies toward the property of its residents.
The constitutionality of a benefit or use statute was questioned in Ioannou
v. New York. 9 The Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, dismissed the
appeal for want of a substantial question. Justices Black and Douglas, however, in a dissenting opinion,' 0 felt that the power of conducting international
affairs was in the hands of the federal government and that the descent and
distribution of property in one nation to citizens of another nation was
dearly a proper subject of international relations.
The second category of alien inheritance statutes is reciprocity statutes,
prevalent in the western states. These limit the rights of nonresident aliens
to inherit from American decedents to those who can show that there is a
reciprocal right for United States citizens to inherit property in the country
where the alien resides. If the alien fails in this burden, the property will be
held by the court.
4. See, e.g., N.Y. Sum Or.

PROC.

§2218 (McKinney 1967) (this has been the prototype

for other benefit or use statutes); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §45-278 (1960); MD. CODE ANN.
art. 93, §161 (1957); MscH. STAT. ANN. §27.3178 (306a) (Supp. 1968); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§3A:25-10 (1953); PL I. GEN. LAws ANN. §33-13-13 (1956). See also MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.

ch. 206, §27A (Supp. 1967); PA. STAT. tit. 20, §1156 (Supp. 1967); Wis. STAT. §318.03 (2)
(1958).
5. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §259 (Deering 1956); IOWA CODE ANN. §567.8 (Supp. 1966);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §91.520 (Supp. 1963); NEV. REv. STAT. §134.230 (1967); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§64-3 to -5 (1965).
6. MAss. GE. LAws ANN. ch. 206, §27A (Supp. 1967).

7. Petition of Mazurowski, 331 Mass. 33, 116 N.E. 2d 854 (1954); In re Ur's Estate, 7
N.J. Super. 455, 71 A2d 665 (Somerset County Ct.), appeal dismissed, 5 N.J. 507, 76 A2d
249 (NJ. 1950); In re Best's Estate, 200 Misc. 332, 107 N.YS.2d 224 (Sur. Ct. 1951); Matter
of Geffen, 199 Misc. 756, 104 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sur. Ct. 1951).
8. Matter of Baier, 305 N.Y. 143, 111 N.E.2d 424 (1953); Treasury Circular 655, 31

CF.R. §211.3 (a) (1959).
9. 371 U.S. 30 (1962).
10. Id. at 30-31.
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The leading case dealing with a reciprocity statute is Clark v. Allen,"
which held that a California alien inheritance statute was constitutional. The
12
Court held that rights of inheritance are to be determined by local law.
However, those rights may be affected by an overriding federal policy, as
where a treaty makes different or conflicting arrangements. 13 Then the state
policy must give way. 14 The Court concluded that there was no prevailing
federal policy on the subject and that the California statute would have only
some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries. Since Clark, however,
other state courts have made minute inquiries into whether reciprocal rights
exist.15 They have been concerned with more than the mere existence of
reciprocal statutory provisions.
In the instant case there were three different grounds presented by the
members of the Court upon which to base the decision. First, the application
of the Oregon statute was unconstitutional. Second, the Oregon statute,
on its face, was unconstitutional, and third, the Oregon statute was constitutional but the 1923 German Friendship Treaty 6 vitiated its application.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Douglas refrained from ruling the statute
unconstitutional on its face. Instead, he alluded to the prior ruling in Clark'7
that a general reciprocity probate statute did not, on its face, intrude on the
federal domain. He concluded that the Oregon statute had been unconstitutionally applied. He observed that the Oregon courts were inquiring into
such matters as the credibility of foreign diplomats and the actual administration of foreign law.- s The Court held that such inquiries had a direct impact
upon foreign relations and as such were an intrusion into the federal domain.
Clark was distinguished on the grounds that the California statute involved
required merely a routine reading of foreign laws as opposed to proof of
reciprocity.
Justices Stewart and Brennan, however, believed that all three requirements of the Oregon statute were unconstitutional on their face. They felt
that these requirements by their very nature required the state courts to make
the kind of inquiries that the majority opinion classified as an unconstitutional infringement into foreign affairs. They wanted the court to follow
a strict interpretation of the constitutional provisions that grant the federal
government supremacy in matters of foreign relations.
Justice Harlan, relying on Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,19
felt that where a case may be disposed of on either of two grounds, one
constitutional and one statutory, it should be decided on the latter. Accord11. 331 US. 503 (1947).
12. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188,

193 (1938).
13. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 190 (1961); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S.
483, 488 (1879).
14. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 55 (1941).
15. Cases cited supra note 7.
16. Treaty with Germany of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights supra note 2.
17. Clark v. Allen, 371 U.S. 30 (1962).
18. State Land Bd. v. Kolovrat, 220 Ore. 448, 461-62, 349 P.2d 255, 262 (1961).
19. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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ing to Harlan, the decision in the present case should have rested on a
reinterpretation of the 1923 German Friendship Treaty.20 The property in
question would then pass pursuant to the treaty provisions and would not
involve any question of constitutionality of the Oregon statute.
The principal case dealt solely with the particular Oregon reciprocity
statute. However, there are indications in the opinion that would make it
equally applicable to benefit or use statutes. The Court cited several cases 21
that construed both reciprocity and benefit or use statutes, inferring that
they could both be unconstitutional in application.
The instant case is of particular significance to Florida probate judges.
With the great influx of Cuban refugees into the state in recent years, it is
only a matter of time before some of these Cubans begin leaving property to
their relatives in Communist Cuba. Florida's statute22 is clearly of the benefit
or use type. The county judge may withhold funds from alien nonresidents
when he determines that the alien "would not have the benefit or use of
control of property due him and that special circumstances make it desirable
that delivery to him be deferred .... The attorney general of Florida, however, issued an opinion 23 in 1962 that reaffirmed the general proposition that
alien nonresidents may inherit in the same manner as residents. He also
expressed the opinion that this right extended to aliens living in an "unfriendly country." Subsequent to this opinion, however, at least one Florida
judge24 has indicated that where there is no applicable treaty the county
judge in the exercise of his discretion may withhold distributions to aliens
residing in Communist countries. Since the United States Supreme Court
refused to promulgate a dear standard as to how far the states may go in
this area, it is hard to predict how this decision will affect the discretionary
powers of the Florida probate judge. The Florida statute does not set any
criteria for the judge's decision, but leaves it solely to his discretion. It would
be possible to argue that the exercise of such discretion is not a fact determination by him and, therefore, not a thrust into international relations.
However, if the judge bases his decision to withhold distributions on a factual
determination of the governmental system of the alien's country, he will be
in danger of reversal.
The majority of the United States Supreme Court agreed that even in the
absence of an enunciated national policy in the area, the power of states to
affect foreign relations is strictly limited. The Court failed, however, to
establish any meaningful standard by which the lower courts can determine
what constitutes an infringement. It has been left to future decisions to
20.
21.
22.

Treaty with Germany of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights supra note 2.
289 U.S. 429, 437 (1968).
FLA. STAT. §731.28 (1967) reads in part: "When the county judge determines that

any alien legatee, devisee, heir, beneficiary or distributee not residing within the territorial limits of the United States or any territory or possession thereof would not have
the benefit or use or control of property due him and that special circumstances make it
desirable that delivery to him be deferred, the county judge may order that such property
be converted into available funds and paid into the state treasury....
23. [1961-1962] FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 525, 527.
24. Brooker, Alien Heirs Residing Behind the Iron Curtain, 38 FLA. B.J. 20, 23 (1964).
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define the limits of the state's powers in this area. The uncertainty created
by this decision is increased due to the Court's failure to affirm or overrule
Clark v. Allen. Instead, the Court contented itself to straddle the fence by
distinguishing Clark on its facts. As a practical matter, however, these two
cases are indistinguishable. It would appear that any state may pass an Iron
Curtain statute, but not an effective one. They may pass statutes that require
a routine reading of foreign laws, but they may not inquire into the functioning of foreign laws.
The Court's conclusion would have been more logical had it followed
the reasoning of Justices Stewart and Brennan or that of Justice Harlan.
Justices Stewart and Brennan pointed out in their concurring opinion that
the Oregon legislature framed its reciprocity law in such a way as to force
the Oregon courts to affect foreign relations. They indicated that any realistic
attempt to apply the state's three criteria would force the Oregon courts to
do more than routinely construe foreign laws. Such application would, of
necessity, trespass upon the exclusive powers of the federal government to
deal in foreign relations as provided for in the Constitution. If such reasoning
had been followed Clark would have been overruled. Thus, states would be
required to follow the intent of the testator and distribute the funds in
accordance with the will. Even if the probate judge knew the alien beneficiary
would not receive the funds he would have no authority to withhold them.
An alternative would be federal legislation encompassing all alien inheritance
within the United States and creating a uniform alien inheritance law
within the United States and its territories.
Justice Harlan noted in his concurring opinion that, if the majority view
is followed, a state may legitimately require reciprocity but it may not take
measures to assure that reciprocity exists in practice. Such an approach is
unreasonable. In addition, he pointed out that the Solicitor General of the
United States had informed the Court that reciprocity statutes had little
effect on the foreign relations and policies of this country. The apprehension
that such an application will cause a deterioration in international relations
is unsubstantiated. It does not constitute the kind of changed conditions
that call for a reexamination of Clark v. Allen. Therefore, according to Justice
Harlan, Clark should be affirmed and the Oregon statute held constitutional
on its face as well as in its application. As a result, states could continue to
regulate descent and distribution to aliens.
The majority should have followed one of these two approaches thereby
providing a clear standard for the states to follow.
DRAKE
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